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Foreign businessmen are once again turning their eyes to the big Chinese 
market. Ever since Chairman Deng Xiaoping decided at the end of the 
1970s to gradually open up the isolated plan economy of the People’s 
Republic of China to the world market, an increasing number of foreign 
companies is competing with each other for a piece of the desirable Chinese 
‘cake’. Different kinds of guanxi (the Chinese version of ‘networking’) in 
terms of economic interests among foreign and Chinese entrepreneurs have 
taken shape. Nowadays, creating guanxi is an essential practice that each 
foreign company willy-nilly has to be familiar with and practice in China. 
Often, good terms with the local ‘mandarins’ help a foreign company to 
make a deal with the Chinese partners and to beat the competition. Dutch 
business seems to be quite successful in playing the rules of this game: 
witness the recent successes of companies such as Royal Philips Electronics 
and Royal Dutch Shell who are among the most successful foreign investors 
in China.1  
Whether the Dutch have benefited from experience, I don’t know, 
but judging from their performance under the restricted regime of the 
European trade at Canton in the eighteenth century, it is sure that at the 
time of the European ‘China Craze’ or Chinoiserie,2 the Dutch were also 
quite successful. Early in the eighteenth century the European East India 
Companies – the French, the English, the Dutch, the Swedish, and so on - 
established direct trade relations with China to purchase silk, porcelain and 
tea, in exchange for silver from America, textiles from India, and spices and 
later opium from Asian establishments. From 1757 to 1840, European (later 
also American) traders were only allowed to do their business at the port of 
Canton in South China. The trade in Canton was organized in a particular 
 
1 As for Royal Philips Electronics and Royal Dutch Shell’s success in China of 
today, refer to the news ‘Philips CEO visits China and strengthens cooperation 
with China’ (25 September 2003) at website www.china.philips.com/ 
informationCenter, and the summary ‘Our business overview’ at website 
www.shell.com/home/Framework?siteId=china-cn.  
2 C.R. Boxer, Jan Compagnie in War and Peace 1602 – 1799 (Hong Kong 1979) 56.  




manner and strictly controlled by Chinese officialdom. Each foreign 
Company should engage one or two Hong merchants, who were designated 
by the Chinese authorities to trade with European traders as security. The 
Hong merchants acted as guarantor for the  payment of customs by the 
Europeans, but were also held responsible for their behavior by the Chinese 
authorities. In order to monopolize the conduct of business with the 
Western merchants, the Hong merchants established a guild, the so-called 
Co-hong, in 1720. It was re-established in 1760 and further refined in 1782. 
The guild continued to exist until  1842, when at long last trade restrictions 
were lifted and as an outcome of the Opium War Hong Kong was 
established as an English crown colony.3  
If not in name, European trade with China was, on account of these 
measures, in practice quite different from the traditional tribute trade of the 
Middle Kingdom.4 During its heyday the Co-hong functioned as a 
‘combination which the Chinese were forming to set their own prices on 
the goods they sold Europeans, thereby to have their proportions of the real 
profit on the said goods, whoever appeared to be the seller’.5 All these 
measures were put into practice on orders of the mandarins in Canton: the 
Tsongtu (Zongdu, 总督)6, the Fooyuern (Fuyuan, 巡抚)7 and the Hoppo (Hubu, 
                                                 
3 For the European China trade and the Co-hong system in Canton during the 
eighteenth century, see for example: H.B. Morse, The International Relations of the 
Chinese Empire (London 1910); Idem, The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading 
to China, 1635-1834 (Oxford 1926); Idem, The Guilds of China: With an Account of the 
Guild Merchant or Co-hong of Canton (London 1909); C.J.A. Jörg, Porcelain and the Dutch 
China Trade (Nijhoff 1982).  
4 In the traditional tributary trade to China there were many strict regulations 
concerning the trading seasons, the number of tributary ships and personnel, the 
amount and sort of trading goods, the anchor port and the land route from there to 
Beijing, the activities of the tributary delegates in China, and the conferment of 
trading certificate, see J. Li and D. Liao The Chinese Ancient Overseas Trade (Nanning 
1995) 217-231.  
5 Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, 5. Usually, the Hoppo 
appointed one or two Hong merchants as security for each European ship. The 
security merchant ‘gave such a price as he was able, or willing, to give, based on his 
interest and expenses’ (Ibidem, 75.)  
6 Styled Viceroy (Governor-General), the highest civil official over the provinces of 
Guangdong and Guangxi. 
7 Called ‘Governor’ or ‘Inspector’, the subordinate colleague of the Viceroy in 
matters relating to the Guangdong province. 




粤海关监督)8. Usually, all the relations of the European traders with 
officialdom would be mediated by the Hong merchants and linguists, since 
China’s Confucian administrative elite showed great disdain for merchants, 
and in particular so for foreign (barbarian) merchants. 
 
 
‘European factories, Canton (1785)’. Drawn, engraved and published by W. Daniell, 
1805. ‘From l. the following flags of the factories can be distinguished – Danish, 
next two are uncertain, probably American and Spanish, then Swedish, British in 
front of the East India Compagny’s Factory shewing the wide verandah on first 
floor, then last at r. , the Dutch.’ Bron: Orange, The Chater Collection, 224, 247. 
 
Under the so-called Co-hong system, there was fierce competition 
among the Western merchants on the trading market in Canton.9 In daily 
life though, the servants of the various East India Companies, who all had 
                                                 
8 The Imperial Commissioner of the Guangdong Customs, with headquarters in 
Canton.  
9 Initially, trade was dominated by the Dutch and English East India Companies. 
By 1730, however, the Canton trade was dominated by the English, while the 
Dutch occupied second place and other Companies could only share the remainder 
(Holden Furber, Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient, 1600 – 1800 (University of 
Minnesota 1976) chapter 3 & 4). It is difficult to show the exact proportions of the 
China trade for all the Western traders, yet if we take the export of Chinese tea in 
1785 – 1833 as an example: on average the English held a share of 74%, the 
continental Europeans 12%, and the Americans 13% (X. Yao, China’s Foreign Trade 
in the Modern Period I (Beijing 1962) 258).  




to live together on a small plot of land during the trading season, got along 
quite well with each other. This situation came to an end in the second half 
of the eighteenth century with the entry of the private free traders, who 
came to claim their share of the profitable China trade. The so-called 
English Country traders obtained their license to trade in their own vessels 
between India and Canton from the English Company (EIC), but it soon 
turned out that they refused to give in to the authority of the Company’s 
delegates in Canton, the so-called supercargoes, because of their strong 
position in the Sino-British trade.10 This obstreperous behavior 
foreshadowed the English supercargoes’ difficult dilemma in the case 
discussed below.  
The better relations, or guanxi, foreign traders had with the Co-hong 
and the lower mandarins with whom they met, the more able they were to 
obtain victories over their competitors. The Dutch East India Company 
(VOC) supercargoes in Canton were well aware of this principle. During the 
‘Golden Years’ of the VOC’s China trade – from the establishment of the 
China Committee11 (1757) to the beginning of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch 
War (1780-1784) – the Dutch in Canton succeeded in keeping satisfactory 
contacts with the Hong merchants, and stayed on particular good terms 
with the mandarins. Whenever affairs headed towards a conflict or crisis, 
they were able to outdo their competitors in Canton, particularly their main 
rival, the English, who kept very shaky relations with the Chinese 
authorities, to say the least.12 It is difficult to ascertain how exactly the 
various parties interacted with each other in those days, but we may find 
                                                 
10 In the last half of the eighteenth century, the Country trade became very 
important to the EIC. The Country traders brought a large amount of cotton (and 
latter opium) from the Indian subcontinent into Canton, where they exchanged the 
earned silver for London (or Bengal) letters of credit with the supercargoes. This 
made up the Company’s deficits in its China trade and even created surpluses. From 
the end of the eighteenth century onwards, the Country trade made up more than 
half of all exports by the English to Canton, and thus the Company depended on 
the Country traders in its China trade. (Li and. Liao, The Chinese Ancient Overseas 
Trade, 500-506.) 
11 In order to manage the China trade more flexibly and efficiently, the China 
Committee, an independent organization was set up by the Gentlemen Seventeen 
in 1756 and was authorized to make direct decisions on the China trade. 
12 This is shown well in both English and Dutch factory records which I am 
working on.  




some clues if we take a closer look at the Companies’ records preserved in 
London and Den Haag.  
The Goede Hoop incident of 1781 that involved the Dutch, the English 
and the Chinese in Canton may serve as a fine example to illustrate the 
vagaries of business life and the role of guanxi in Canton. On 17 August 
1781, captain John McClary of the English Country ship Dadoloy, coming 
from Bengal, captured a Dutch private ship, the Goede Hoop, coming from 
Surat at the roadstead of Canton. Subsequently, the mandarins of Canton, 
who were immediately informed by the Dutch supercargoes of this seizure, 
sent troops to surround the English ship, forcing captain McClary to restore 
his prize. At the same time, they dispatched officials to the English 
supercargoes in Macao and asked them to make the captain obey their 
orders. Eventually, the mandarins succeeded by force to compel captain 
McClary to give up the Dutch private ship, and pressed the English 
supercargoes to force McClary to return all the remaining goods. From the 
Goede Hoop case we can get a better understanding of conflicts between the 
VOC and the EIC, the two main rivals, and their respective relationships 
with the mandarins in Canton. 
 
 
Process of the Goede Hoop case 
 
On 17 August 1781, it was reported to the English supercargoes in Macao13 
that captain John McClary of the English Country ship the Dadoloy had that 
day captured the private ship the Goede Hoop under Dutch colors at 
Whampoa. Captain McClary excused his action by pointing out that Britain 
had declared war against the Dutch Republic in December 1780.  
The Dutch supercargoes in Macao reacted promptly to this act of 
aggression. They first demanded from other European supercargoes a co-
signed statement pressing the English supercargoes to condemn captain 
McClary for his act, but their colleagues refused to do so. Then, on the 
security merchants’ advice, they requested the mandarins of Canton on 21 
August to intervene. Canton was a neutral port where the ships of foreign 
nations – even if they were at war with each other - should never break the 
local peace, and more acts of violence might probably follow if they did not 
                                                 
13 During the so-called off-season (when there was no trade) the foreigners were 
not allowed to stay in their offices in Canton but had to withdraw to Macao, the 
tiny Portuguese concession at the mouth of the Pearl River.  




take action.14 On the same day, the Dutch chief supercargo C. Heyligendorp 
sent a letter to the English supercargoes, strongly protesting that: 
 
Justifying this act on account of the rupture between the two 
nations, we cannot but think it proper to address ourselves to you in 
this empire the representations of your sovereign and the company 
in order to represent to you the injustice of such a procedure, as you 
cannot but be sensible that the ships of the belligerent powers 
anchored in a neutral port are always considered in safety from the 
attacks of each other; [such a act] may have consequence that will be 
very prejudicial to both companies, [... and] will be exposed to similar 
enterprises as well as those of private persons. We require your 
assistance, in order that the Dutch ship with her crew and cargo is 
restored immediately. But in case this cannot be affected we shall 
find ourselves under necessity of protesting in the strongest manner 
against this action and make the author of it answerable for all the 
consequences it might have. 15
 
This letter was originally written in Dutch and then was changed to 
French (not to English, as required by the English, who said no person in 
their factory understood Dutch). The English arrogantly replied in English, 
for they said that some of the Dutch understood English well enough. In 
their reply, the English mentioned that they agreed to respect the neutrality 
of ports in the sovereignties which were at peace, but that they had no 
control over the captains of the Country ships. The only thing they could 
do, they said, was to try to promote the strictest observation of this 
neutrality by the ships of the English Company, not those of the private 
traders.16 The Dutch, of course, were not satisfied with such an answer. 
Suffering, as the weaker party,17 from an obviously disadvantageous 
                                                 
14 Nationaal Archief, Archief van de Factorij Canton (AFC), 1.04.20/44, 21 August 
and 15 October 1781. 
15 Letter of the Dutch supercargoes to the English supercargoes, see AFC/1.04.20/ 
292, 21 August 1781, or British Library, India Office Records (IOR) – G/12/72-3, 
22 August 1781. 
16 Letter of the English supercargoes to the Dutch supercargoes, see IOR – 
G/12/72-3, 23 August 1781. 
17 The Fourth Anglo-Dutch War proved to be a disaster for the Dutch. In the 
month of January 1781 alone the British navy and privateers captured no fewer 
than 200 Dutch vessels, completely paralysing what remained of Dutch shipping 
(see Schulte Nordholt, Dutch Republic and American Independence (Chapel Hill 1979) 




position in the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War they could do nothing but appeal 
to the Chinese authorities. 
After receiving complaints from the Dutch supercargoes about this act of 
violence, the mandarins of Canton instantly demanded restitution of the 
Dutch ship. Captain McClary did not want to return his prize at all, but tried 
to negotiate the cargo to be sold to the Chinese merchants as if she 
belonged to the Dutch. This would mean that the Hoppo would not lose 
his duties, if the other mandarins did not interfere. He stated that he would 
take his prize out of the river and carry her away, should he be hindered in 
any way by the Chinese authorities. The mandarins were infuriated and 
continued to insist that McClary should restore the ship, whereupon he 
started to rerig her, and descended with the tide towards the fort Boca 
Tigris. Every man in the Chinese customs office was by now greatly 
alarmed. All the troops that could be gathered, about 2000 soldiers, were 
ordered to a rendezvous point at Tiger Island18 and every preparation was 
made to block captain McClary’s passage.  
The mandarins still preferred to solve the problem in a peaceful 
manner, and officials were dispatched to the English supercargoes in 
Macao, who now found themselves in a very disagreeable situation. On 24 
august, a mandarin came to Macao and addressed the English supercargoes, 
not through a merchant or linguist as usual, but through the Portuguese 
procurator of the city. He complained much of the outrages and insults to 
the imperial government caused by their English countrymen, and told that 
he would hold the English supercargoes accountable for McClary’s 
behavior, if they did not oblige him to restore forthwith everything he had 
taken. The supercargoes replied that they had heard of what had happened 
at Whampoa only by common report, as such affairs were not part of their 
responsibilities. They said they had no control over Mr. McClary, the 
captain of a Country ship, and therefore could not compel him to do 
anything. But they assured the mandarin that they considered the act illegal 
and violent, and also desired to prevent captain McClary from persevering 
in his evil way; they would exhort him to make ample restitution to the 
satisfaction of the mandarins. Their offer was accepted, and the mandarin 
                                                                                                             
150-156). Further, the British captured all the West African forts belonging to the 
Dutch West India Company, except Elmina; the Dutch also lost the west Guyana 
colonies, several bases in southern India and Ceylon. The VOC was to go bankrupt 
just a few years after the war.  
18 The place that commands the entrance of the river. 




himself delivered the supercargoes’ letter to captain McClary in which the 
supercargoes, however, only wrote to captain McClary that his 
noncompliance might endanger the existence of the Company’s trade into 
this port. The next day a second mandarin came to the supercargoes and  
 
 
‘Canton-Macao-Hongkong’. Bron: H.B. Morse, The Chronicles of the East India 
Compagny trading to China 1635-1834 Volume I (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
1926). 
 
was brushed off in the same way. The day after that, another one showed 
up, who delivered the message that the attendance of the English chief and 
other supercargoes was required at Boca Tigris, in order to compel captain 
McClary to comply with the demands of the Tsongtu. The chief supercargo J. 
Bradshaw complained that no Hong merchant was sent to inform him of 
the particularities of this business, which he knew only from vague rumor or 
from what the mandarins had told him. He stated that the supercargoes had 




already done everything in their power and that he, as the chief supercargo, 
would neither put himself into a so humiliating and disagreeable situation, 
nor subject himself to be sent to Boca Tigris. With this unsatisfying answer, 
the mandarin went away. Afterwards, other mandarins continued to come 
to Macao almost every day, using threats that the trade of the English 
Company, as well as that of the private persons, would be adversely affected 
by the conduct of captain McClary. They did not care for the argument that 
the supercargoes had no control over other ships than those of the 
Company. The more the mandarins of Canton realized their lack of power 
over the real offender, the more they appeared determined to implicate the 
English supercargoes. Fortunately, for the English supercargoes a way out 
of this tricky situation was created. 
While pressurizing the English supercargoes in Macao, the Chinese 
authorities were at the same time still continuing direct negotiations with 
captain McClary on the Pearl River. As the ships Dadoloy and Goede Hoop 
were moving down with the tide, the principal magistrates of Canton and 
the merchants were all encircling them with boats. They kept constant  
contact with captain McClary, sometimes they attempted to intimidate him, 
at other times they tried to sooth him, but the English captain was not 
impressed by any of these shouting opponents. Yet it was clear to him he 
would never be able to leave the river unscathed. In the end, the Hong 
merchant Puan Khequa, the principal security merchant of the EIC, 
contrived the following scheme. It was agreed that when McClary 
approached the fort Boca Tigris with his Dutch prize, he would order his 
men off the Goede Hoop. This was done and immediately the ship was 
boarded in a triumphant manner by the shouting Chinese.  
The mandarin went to see the English supercargoes again on 29 
August, for the Fooyuern had been informed by the aggrieved Dutch party, 
that part of the cargo of the Goede Hoop was still missing. He maintained 
that the English supercargoes should press captain McClary into returning 
everything. The English complained this time that the mandarin in Canton 
had contacted them in a very extraordinary and unusual manner, for on 
every former occasion the mandarins had made use of the Hong merchants 
and linguists to convey their messages. 
Captain McClary’s conduct gave the English supercargoes a lot of 
trouble in Macao. By order of the mandarins of Canton, the local 
magistrates had sent ships to prevent McClary escaping with his prize. It 
was rumored in Canton that the Fooyuern was preparing to do whatever he 
could to compel captain McClary to make an ample restitution. The English  
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were even informed on 3 September, that a mandarin from Canton had 
asked the Portuguese governor of Macao to seize some persons of the 
English factory and have them delivered to him, but the latter had refused 
this. On 8 September, the Dutch supercargoes wrote a letter to the 
mandarins once again informing that captain McClary still refused to return 
all the remaining items in accordance with the mandarins’ order. The 
Dadoloy was therefore surrounded with Chinese boats, positioned to prevent 
any communication with the English supercargoes.  
On 23 September, the English supercargoes came back to Canton 
and spoke with Puan Khequa at once over captain McClary’s actions. Puan 
Khequa informed them that the Fooyuern was extremely dissatisfied with 
captain McClary’s behavior and wanted to punish him as a pirate; he was 
moreover much displeased with the English supercargoes, because they had 
procrastinated in complying with his orders. Nothing could have prevented 




the Fooyuern using violence against the English, but Puan Khequa made up a 
story in which he explained that the English Company resided in the ‘north’ 
[England] while the individual traders came from the ‘south’ [India], and 
that the English were at war with these ‘southern’ people, even in their own 
country, so it was no wonder that these people would not accept the English 
supercargoes orders in Canton. By such means, the Fooyuern seemed to calm 
down a little. Then on 28 September the English supercargoes, together 
with the other European supercargoes, received a general chop19 under the 
name of the Tsongtu, Fooyuern and Hoppo, saying that:20
 
As it is the first time a thing of this nature has happened, and as the 
offender pleaded ignorance of the laws and customs of this country, 
we have forgiven him and have moreover excused him the payment 
of port charges, and ordered all the assistance that may be necessary 
for the repairing of his ship and preparing her for the voyage. This is 
to give notice to the supercargoes of the different nations in order 
that they may inform their countrymen that the emperor will not 
suffer them to bring war into his dominions, and that whoever does 
so in future shall be treated as an enemy. 
 
After reading the chop, the English supercargoes became fully aware of the 
extent to which the mandarins were inclined to consider them responsible 
for all the irregularities or outrages that were committed by the commanders 
of the Country ships. They therefore thought it a proper precaution to 
address a letter to the mandarins, expressing their outrage over captain 
McClary’s unjustifiable conduct, but disclaiming any kind of power over 
ships not belonging to the English Company. They further explained that 
they had not gone to Boca Tigris because of illness, and complained of the 
ill treatment they had received from the low ranking mandarins. Finally, 
they denied there was a difference between Englishmen from the ‘north’ 
and the ‘south’, insisting that this was due to a mistranslation by the security 
merchant. They, however, found that the answer of the Fooyuern of 2 
October was full of ‘boasting, insult and threat, as was never before used to 
Europeans, even in this scene of their humiliation’21, because he wrote that: 
 
                                                 
19 A ‘chop’ is an official letter. 
20 Chop of the Tsongtou, Fooyuern and Hoppo, see IOR – G/12/72-3, 9 
September 1781. 
21 IOR – G/12/72-73, 17 August 1781. 




You English are a lying and injurious people, for other nations that 
come to Canton are peaceful and do not hurt anyone, but you 
English are always making trouble. But a little time ago one McClary 
took a ship and her cargo and second supercargoes are sent here by 
your king to superintend the business of the company, and private 
persons are permitted to trade here by the same power. Why did you 
therefore say that you had no power to prevent the misdeeds of 
those people, and refused to obey when I ordered you to come to 
Boca Tigris to oblige this McClary to restore what he had taken? (...) 
If your sickness was not feigned why do you excuse yourselves for 
not coming to the Boca Tigris by telling me you have no control 
over private persons? From such equivocations I see the whole is 
falsehood, and it is not clear to me but this attempt to take away the 
ship was done by your order (...). Let me inform you that if hereafter 
you do not attend to my orders the English ships shall not be 
permitted to trade here, and I will send my soldiers to expel you 
from the country. What will you then do? (...) To my tribunal your 
representations seem insolent and impertinent. (...) If any of you 
English in future shall do wrong, whether supercargoes or 
individuals, he shall be punished to the full measure of his crime. 22
  
 
The reply of the mandarins deepened the English supercargoes’ awareness 
of their awkward situation: every mandarin in Canton exerted his authority 
over them to his own humor and was hostile to them. They felt that they 
could not rely on the justice of the mandarins for their affairs. The only 
solution was to patiently bear this treatment as if with a timid character, 
although they were not willing to subdue themselves at all.  
In fact, the English envied the good relations of the Dutch with the 
mandarins in Canton extremely. One striking example is the case of a Dutch 
seaman who was murdered by one of his own countrymen months before. 
The Dutch supercargoes were not forced to deliver the murderer to the 
mandarins but executed him themselves on board of one of their ships in 
sight of the Chinese. Privileges of this kind were not granted to other 
Europeans. In October 1780 a French sailor killed a Portuguese sailor in 
Canton and thus the Portuguese chief supercargo petitioned that the culprit 
should be handed over to him, so that the murderer could be tried in 
                                                 
22 Edict of the Fooyuern to the English supercargoes, see IOR – G/12/72-3, 2 
October 1781. 




Portugal. The Fooyuern, however, did not accept this petition but put the 
murderer on trial. These two examples showed the divergent nature of the 
proceedings of the Chinese tribunal, while dealing with different Europeans. 
The English supercargoes judged therefore that if a murder would occur 
involving the English, there was little probability that they could try the 
culprit themselves, but that the mandarins would try, condemn and execute 
the murderer.23
It could be assumed that the poor position of the English 
supercargoes in Canton and Macao was caused by their nonintervention in 
captain McClary’s business, but it was actually of their own making. 
Apparently, the English had learned the wrong lesson from the ‘Chinese 
debts’ trouble in 1779, in which Sir Edward Vernon (Admiral and 
Commander in chief of the squadron and fleet of the EIC in India) 
dispatched captain John A. Panton to the mandarins of Canton, requesting 
the liquidation of the Chinese merchants’ debts to the British creditors in 
Madras as well as in England. The English supercargoes had been forced at 
that occasion to negotiate, on behalf of the British creditors, with the 
mandarins of Canton. After failed negotiations, the mandarins reported this 
to Beijing. As a result, the Chinese merchants who were involved in the 
debts were punished severely, and not only did the British creditors receive 
a very unreasonable liquidation for their lent money, but the Company’s 
business also suffered from this trouble.24 Now, in captain McClary’s case, 
the English supercargoes probably felt it unwise to get involved in the 
trouble caused not by them, but by their countrymen, yet both the Dutch 
and the Chinese, from beginning to end, felt that the English supercargoes 
should exercise control over captain McClary in the case of the crime he 
had committed. It is therefore easy to understand that the Dutch chief 
supercargo headed directly for the English supercargoes when some cargo 
and a chest belonging to the Goede Hoop were still not returned. On 28 
October, the Dutch chief who arrived at Canton from Macao delivered the 
English chief a statement, containing a detailed account of sundry stores, as 
well as a chest of gold and pearls still held by captain McClary.25 Confronted 
                                                 
23 This judgment is expressed strongly by the English supercargoes in their diary. 
See IOR – G/12/72-3, 14 February 1781.  
24 For the liquidation of the ‘Chinese debts’, see Kuo-tung Ch’en, The insolvency of the 
Chinese Hong Merchants, 1760-1843 (Taipeh 1990).  
25 The detailed account of sundry stores and a chest of gold and pearls is appended 
to the statement, see IOR – G/12/72-3, 28 October 1781. 




with this evidence, the English supercargoes at once protested to McClary 
and demanded him to return all the remaining goods forthwith.  
On 4 November, the Goede Hoop was advertised for sale by auction at 
Whampoa, but was not sold until one year later in October 1782 when it 
became British property. On 16 December 1781, captain McClary, the 
troublemaker, fitted out his ship in a warlike manner and left the Pearl River 
for Bengal loudly declaring that he intended to take many Dutch prizes on 
the sea on his trip back to India. This was no empty talk, because a few 
months later, he plundered, without hesitation, a Chinese junk bound for 
Batavia in the straits of Banka, his excuse being that the property on board 
the junk belonged to the Dutch.26
 
 
Understandings of the Goede Hoop case 
 
The Goede Hoop matter came to a happy end since the Dutch received a full 
restitution. As far as their role in the matter was concerned, the English 
supercargoes made a rather unwise choice. Inept attempts to keep their 
hands clean severely weakened their position, and from the 1780s onwards 
business in Canton became more difficult to conduct. On the contrary, the 
Dutch had thoroughly outmaneuvered the English by involving the Chinese 
authorities in this affair. During the whole process the Dutch behaved in a 
very shrewd manner. They did not directly take up arms against the 
troublemaking captain McClary, but lodged protests with the English 
supercargoes; at the same time, they begged the mandarins to intervene, and 
availed themselves of the opportunities that the Hong merchants offered as 
well. The mandarins could have let matters slide, if they had given the 
excuse that it was inappropriate for them to interfere in this kind of trouble 
between the two European nations at war. Yet, they chose to deal actively 
with the trouble by confronting the English side, because they felt offended 
by the English behavior and had lost face. Not only did they surround 
captain McClary’s ship, but they also threatened the English supercargoes 
that they might stop the EIC’s trade into Canton. Their intervention was, in 
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the eyes of the Chinese at least, fully justified because captain McClary was 
flaunting Chinese rules, and because of the wire pulling of the English 
supercargoes and their attitude of non-cooperation. Normally, the 
mandarins themselves would never have considered addressing the Western 
traders directly, but only through the security merchants or linguists, yet in 
this case they sent several officials, one after another. They did so because 
of their good relations with the Dutch, in order to save face, to show their 
jurisdiction, and most of all: to maintain sovereignty.  
As soon as they started to trade into Canton, the Dutch tried to make 
a favorable impression on the mandarins by portraying themselves as 
‘honest men’. They did their business with the Hong merchants on basis of 
paying respects to the Chinese authorities, as they were fully aware of the 
role of the Chinese authorities in this trade. They pursued a similar policy 
with the Japanese bureaucracy when they traded in Nagasaki.27 Sure enough, 
the Dutch supercargoes just imitated the differential attitude of the Chinese 
sea merchants towards the Dutch authorities in Batavia, ‘a prosperous 
country, famous among the maritime countries’, where, the Chinese thought 
right up to the early nineteenth century, the Dutch came from.28 The good 
relations between the Batavian government and the Chinese merchants 
made the latter stand out on the Batavia market. In return, the lenient 
attitude of the Batavian government towards the Chinese merchants most 
likely also favored the attitude of the Cantonese administration towards the 
Dutch supercargoes.  
 The English could only blame themselves for having bad relations 
with the mandarins, yet they were not in an easy position. On the one hand, 
the English supercargoes, when doing their business, always challenged the 
Cantonese authorities in the interest of the EIC. They grumbled that the 
English Company’s business suffered a lot from the irrationality of the 
Chinese mandarins who showed great disdain for foreign merchants, 
despite the fact that these enriched the treasury in Canton. In practice, the 
Hoppo became their prime target, as he was directly in charge of the 
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customs administration that supervised the Canton trade and he was the 
only relatively high official that foreign traders might ever get in touch with. 
On the other hand, the English Country ships continuously broke the trade 
policy of Canton, by evading the port duties or smuggling forbidden 
merchandize. By confronting the mandarins’ jurisdiction as in this case, the 
Country traders eventually brought the EIC into trouble. The English 
supercargoes originally had no means of disciplining the Country traders 
because they were private free traders, not servants of the English 
Company. This differed from the much smaller private trade supervised by 
the Dutch supercargoes in Canton. Nonetheless, after more and more 
complaints reached London in 1783, 1784 and 1785, when an increasing 
number of the Country ships sailed from the Indian subcontinent to China 
the English supercargoes started to exercise strict control over the Country 
traders.29 On account of all their offences, the English in Canton earned 
notoriety as ‘the worst of bad people’30 from the mandarins. Along with the 
development of the English trade with China, the misunderstandings and 
tensions between the English and the mandarins in Canton did not 
decrease, but increase. This formed one of the backgrounds to the Opium 
War (1839-1841).  
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